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ZARDA AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION EXPRESSION: 
A NEW HIGH FOR TITLE VII INTERPRETATION 
Nico Ramos† 
Imagine the rumble of a plane’s single engine as it reaches its desired altitude.  
You are faced with your most important work responsibility, a task that has a 
very small margin of error.  Your extensive training and certifications have 
prepared you for this moment; you are about to guide a person on their very first 
skydive.  Tightly strapped to your client, you walk her to the edge of the plane’s 
open dock as she shakes nervously.  The sounds of wind require you to scream 
despite only being inches away from the first timer’s ear, “jump on three!”  
Looking down from 13,000 feet, you thrust both bodies out of the plane.  In a 
nearly 60 second free fall, you haven’t forgotten your main responsibility: to 
ensure that the life attached to you makes it safely back to the hangar.  The years 
of training pays off.  Adeptly and with perfect timing, you pull the strap; a 
specially folded parachute catapults from your back; you firmly grasp the person 
in front of you so that they are stabilized as the deployed chute drastically 
reduces the speed at which you were plummeting.  After absorbing the one of a 
kind views, you prepare for landing.  Success!  Both you and your passenger 
completed a tandem skydive; she experienced an exhilarating adrenaline rush, 
and you ensured that she experienced it safely.  Now, imagine; two days later, 
for something that has no relation to your employment record or ability to 
perform your job, you are fired and left without recourse.  For many Americans, 
this requires no imagination at all.  This is exactly what happened to sky diving 
instructor Donald Zarda.  Despite jumping out of planes for a living, the most 
serious risk Mr. Zarda took before completing a tandem skydive on a warm 
summer day in 2010 was revealing that he was gay. 
Approximately 75 percent of Americans are under the mistaken impression 
that there are federal anti-discrimination protections for lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender and queer or questioning (LGBTQ) people.1  Though nearly 70 
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 1. ROBERT P. JONES ET AL., A SHIFTING LANDSCAPE: A DECADE OF CHANGE IN AMERICAN 
ATTITUDES ABOUT SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND LGBT ISSUES 35 (2013), https://www.prri.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/2014.LGBT_REPORT-1.pdf (noting the knowledge of employment 
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percent of voters support federal laws barring workplace discrimination for gay 
and transgender people, there are no such federal protections.2  States have 
attempted to remedy the absence of federal law; however, as of 2017, in 28 
states, it is permissible to fire individuals based on sexual orientation.3  A gay 
person can exercise his or her constitutional right to marry, and then 
subsequently be lawfully fired for exercising it.4 
Evolving Supreme Court interpretation of Title VII has provided a foundation 
for a new approach in addressing whether sexual orientation discrimination is 
protected by Title VII.5  A growing number of courts are finding sexual 
orientation to be a proxy for sex, establishing that negative employment actions 
based on sexual orientation are a prohibited form of workplace discrimination 
based on a person’s gender.6 
In Zarda v. Altitude Express, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit directly addressed the issue.7  By examining legislative history, 
Supreme Court rulings, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
                                                     
nondiscrimination laws); see 2017 Workplace Equality Fact Sheet: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and 
Transgender (LGBT) Workplace Discrimination at a Glance, OUT & EQUAL, 
http://outandequal.org/2017-workplace-equality-fact-sheet/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2019) (asserting 
that one quarter of LGBTQ Americans admit they have experienced workplace discrimination once 
in the past five years); see also Shabab Ahmed Mirza et al., The State of the LGBTQ Community in 
the Labor Market: Pre-June 2018 Jobs Day Release, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 5, 2018, 9:01 
AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/ news/2018/07/05/453094/state-lgbtq-
community-labor-market-pre-june-2018-jobs-day-release/ (indicating studies that job applicants 
who identify as LGBTQ on their resume are less likely to receive callbacks in comparison to 
applicants who do not self-identify). 
 2. JONES, supra note 1, at 34. 
 3. See 2017 Workplace Equality Fact Sheet, supra note 1. 
 4. Tessa M. Register, The Case for Deferring to the EEOC’s Interpretations in Macy and 
Foxx to Classify LGBT Discrimination as Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 102 IOWA L. REV. 
1397, 1398 (2017).  See also Lisa Bornstein & Megan Bench, Advancing LGBTQIA Rights in a 
Post- Obergefell World: Married on Sunday, Fired on Monday: Approaches to Federal LGBT Civil 
Rights Protections, 22 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 31, 42–43 (2015) (suggesting that judicial 
advances have allowed for Title VII expansion by helping to shift American attitudes on gender 
roles, gender equality, and sexual orientation with each subsequent case building off the preceding 
holding). 
 5. Robert Brookins, A Rose by Any Other Name . . . The Gender Basis of Same-Sex Sexual 
Harassment, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 441, 537 (1998). 
 6. Eric C. Surette, Annotation, Discrimination on Basis of Sexual Orientation as Form of 
Sex Discrimination Proscribed by Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28. A.L.R. FED. 3D 4, § 2 
(2018).  These approaches in interpreting “because of sex” discrimination are based on interpretive 
analysis of the term “sex” itself.  Id.  The crux of the argument is that ambiguous text should be 
read broadly in terms to reach the ultimate goal of the statute and that the Supreme Court has applied 
a broad application to the term sex.  Id. 
 7. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018). 
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guidance and competing circuit approaches, the court, sitting en banc, overruled 
decades of precedence with a persuasive legal argument that is becoming 
increasingly utilized by other jurisdictions, establishing sexual orientation 
discrimination as a cognizable claim under Title VII.8 
Passed by the 88th Congress, Title VII of the momentous Civil Rights Act of 
1964 established protections against invidious workplace discrimination on the 
basis of race, religion, and sex.9  The prohibition against discrimination “because 
of sex” was a last minute addition to the bill,10 resulting in a dearth of 
Congressional intent as to how “because of sex” was to be defined.11  Early 
Supreme Court cases brought under Title VII utilized a narrow definition of sex 
discrimination,12 and in the same spirit, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit has rigidly interpreted Title VII to exclude sexual orientation 
discrimination from its many protections, meaning a plaintiff who experienced 
sexual orientation discrimination was barred from alleging a violation of Title 
VII.13  However, the definition of sex discrimination is not static; it took on a 
broader meaning after the EEOC held in Baldwin v. Foxx that a complaint 
alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation falls within the 
Commission’s jurisdiction and that sexual orientation discrimination is 
discrimination based on sex.14  The Second Circuit re-examined the issue.15  By 
analyzing the Supreme Court’s permissive approach to “because of sex” 
discrimination in light of changing EEOC policy and divergent circuit 
                                                     
 8. Id. at 107–08. 
 9. Surette, supra note 6, at § 2. 
 10. Tiffany L. King, Comment, Working Out: Conflicting Title VII Approaches to Sex 
Discrimination and Sexual Orientation, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1005, 1014 (2002). 
 11. Charly Shane Gilfoil, Note, More than Just “Sex:” Title VII, The Expanding Meaning of 
Sex Discrimination, and the Court’s Role in Correcting Injustice, 19 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 135, 
139 (2017); see Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (holding that denying 
a woman employment due to having a pre-school aged child while not denying a man the same 
position in employment despite having a pre-school aged child violated Title VII prohibition on 
disparate treatment of women). 
 12. Gilfoil, supra note 11, at 139. 
 13. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000), overruled by Zarda v. Altitude Express, 
Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 14. Baldwin v. Foxx, 2015 WL 4397641, at *10 (E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015).  An Air Traffic 
Control Specialist in Miami filed a complaint with the EEOC, alleging he was subjected to 
discrimination for being a gay male, and was not selected for promotion due to his sexual 
orientation.  Id. at *1–2.  The EEOC accepted the complaint for investigation and held that sexual 
orientation discrimination requires and impermissible consideration of gender.  Id. 
 15. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 112–13. 
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approaches, the Second Circuit, for the first time, recognized sexual orientation 
discrimination as a cognizable claim under Title VII.16 
This Note examines the implications of Zarda in the workplace.  Part I 
provides the relevant prior law leading up to the case by exploring the landscape 
of Title VII’s legislative history and the Supreme Court’s evolving approach in 
interpreting, “because of sex” discrimination.  Part I will further examine the 
EEOC’s novel approach to Title VII and its subsequent influence utilized by the 
Seventh Circuit in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, where a 
female professor alleged that she was denied promotion because she was in a 
relationship with a woman—ultimately influencing the Second Circuit’s 
approach.17  Part II will detail the relevant facts and ultimate holding of the 
Zarda court, including an explanation of the concurrences and dissents.  Part III 
will discuss the reasoning employed by the Second Circuit and analyze the three 
most utilized approaches in analyzing Title VII, associational, comparative, and 
gender stereotyping, culminating with an analysis of the best legal argument to 
successfully extend Title VII protections to sexual orientation. 
I. TITLE VII: BACKGROUND 
A. Scarce Legislative History 
Title VII provides: 
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or . . . adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.18 
At its inception, the provision was intended to foster equal employment 
opportunities and to do away with historical barriers against minorities and 
women in the workplace.19  The prohibition of discrimination “based on sex” 
                                                     
 16. Surette, supra note 6, at § 2. 
 17. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2012). 
 19. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that race 
discrimination was the primary concern of Congress in its enactment). 
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was added on the last day of the statute’s floor debate.20  Opponents of the act 
believed that the last minute addition of “sex” based prohibitions would defeat 
the bill due to the controversial nature of federal protections for women in 
employment.21  Ultimately the plan failed and Congress drafted Title VII to 
include sex discrimination as a necessary component to a broader prohibition on 
workplace discrimination.22  Congress, for lack of time, failed to define the term, 
leaving little left for courts to analyze in the context of Congressional intent for 
elucidating what “because of sex” discrimination means.23  As a result, early 
Title VII cases applied a definition of “because of sex” to a narrow set of 
circumstances most consistent with lawmakers’ initial understanding when Title 
VII was ratified: sex discrimination means the exclusion of women in the 
workplace, meaning, only women could successfully allege violation of Title 
VII’s sex discrimination prohibitions.24  It did not take long for “instances of 
unwelcome and unanticipated workplace scenarios”25 to challenge the limits of 
“because of sex” discrimination’s early delineation.26  In a series of decisions 
from the 1980s, the Court decamped from the original interpretation of Title 
VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination beginning with permitting males to allege 
“because of sex” discrimination in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. 
v. EEOC.27 
After recognizing that a male can allege sex discrimination, the Court in 
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, again broadened its interpretation of sex to 
accord with Congress’ broader attempt at eliminating multiple forms of 
discrimination in the workplace.28  Though early cases limited sex 
discrimination to: 1) denying employment/promotion to women, or 2) 
preventing employers from implementing policies that benefit one gender over 
another; the Court began to address how Title VII was to apply in situations of 
                                                     
 20. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977) (“Sex as a basis 
of discrimination was added as a floor amendment one day before the House approved Title VII, 
without prior hearing or debate.”). 
 21. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1986) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2577–
84 (1964)). 
 22. Major Velma Cheri Gay, Fifty Years Later . . . Still Interpreting the Meaning of “Because 
of Sex” Within Title VII and Whether it Prohibits Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 73 A.F.L. 
REV. 61, 67 (2015). 
 23. King, supra note 10, at 1007–08. 
 24. Gilfoil, supra note 11, at 139. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 675–76 (1983) 
(holding that an employer violated Title VII’s prohibition by creating benefits that advantaged 
women employees while disadvantaging men employees). 
 28. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1986). 
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sexual harassment.29  Despite Title VII’s initial application to protect women 
from discrimination in the workplace and never once mentioning sexual 
harassment in the bill itself or floor debate, the Court reasoned that 
Congressional silence on sexual harassment pertaining to Title VII could not 
contemplate the extent and reach of the statute’s protections, ultimately adding 
sexual harassment to the broader protections of Title VII’s prohibitions on 
discrimination “because of sex.”30 
Seven years later, the Court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 
again extended “because of sex” to include male on male sexual harassment.31  
The Scalia opinion found, “no justification in the statutory language or of our 
precedents” to bar a plaintiff from recovery when the facts indicate that adverse 
employment treatment was based on the plaintiff’s sex.32  This permissive 
approach taken by the Court has resulted in Title VII claims that were not 
initially considered during its ratification, yet not explicitly prohibited.33  The 
Court has justified its approach, stating that Title VII “evinces a congressional 
intent ‘to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women’ 
in employment.”34  Oncale directly addressed the Court’s interpretation of 
Congressional intent for the application of Title VII protections: 
[M]ale-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not 
the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title 
VII. But statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to 
cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions 
of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by 
which we are governed.35 
                                                     
 29. Id. at 64–65. 
 30. Id.  A heterosexual male defendant raped, intimidated and exchanged sexual favors in 
exchange for allowing a female plaintiff to retain her job.  Id. at 60. 
 31. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 32. Id. at 79.  A male oil-platform crew member, who was physically assaulted, threatened 
with rape, and was the subject of sexually themed actions by other male crew members, alleged he 
was discriminated against in his employment because of his sex.  Id. at 77.  The Court found that 
Title VII permited a claim of sex discrimination despite the plaintiff and defendant being of the 
same sex.  Id. at 79–80. 
 33. Discrimination based on sex under Title VII is the fourth most common claim of 
workplace discrimination.  See EEOC Releases Fiscal Year 2017 Enforcement and Litigation Data, 
EEOC (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/1-25-18.cfm (last visited 
Aug. 21, 2019) (discovering the more than 25,000 allegations of discrimination based on sex in 
2017, alleged sexual harassment in nearly 26% of those complaints). 
 34. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 64 (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 
U.S. 702, 707, n.13 (1978)). 
 35. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
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Covering reasonable evils is illustrative of the Court’s approach that “has . . .  
attempted to read ambiguous text consistent with Title VII’s broader 
purposes.”36 
By 1993, nearly 30 years after Title VII’s passage, the definition of sex 
discrimination had evolved to represent a multitude of nefarious work place 
scenarios.37  Harris v. Forklift Systems added to the evolution by recognizing a 
second form of sexual harassment: hostile work environment.38  The Court again 
opted for a broad definition of “because of sex,” holding that a hostile work 
environment contributes to a “discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment”39 
and therefore, violated Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination “because 
of . . . sex.”40 
B. Reasonable Comparable Evils: The Permissive Approach to Because of Sex 
Discrimination and Gender Stereotyping 
In a landmark 1989 holding, the Court provided one of the broadest 
interpretations of Title VII’s prohibitions by establishing sex-stereotyping as a 
form of sex discrimination.41  In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a senior manager 
at an accounting firm was denied a promotion because she exhibited masculine 
traits such as: not wearing makeup, acting aggressively, and dressing in non-
feminine attire.42  The Court looked to precedent,43 and the language of Title 
VII.44  Justice Brennan’s opinion interpreted the provision “to mean that gender 
                                                     
 36. Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Supreme Court Chipping Away at Title VII: Strengthening 
It or Killing It?, 74 LA. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2014).  See William R. Corbett, Babbling About 
Employment Discrimination Law: Does the Master Builder Understand the Blueprint for the Great 
Tower?, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 683, 685 (2010) (“From the beginning, it was an astoundingly 
ambitious, and perhaps audacious, project.  Congress envisioned a tower of law that would elevate 
people . . . by attempting to eradicate invidious employment discrimination.”). 
 37. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993). 
 38. Id. at 18–19. 
 39. Id. at 21. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).  See King, supra note 10, at 1021–
23.  See also Cody Perkins, Comment: Sex and Sexual Orientation: Title VII After Macy v. Holder, 
65 ADMIN. L. REV. 427, 432–33 (2013). 
 42. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 231–35. 
 43. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (holding that a 
differential discriminatory action occurs when “treatment of a person in a manner which but for 
that person’s sex would be different”).  The Court further provided that the statute focuses “on 
fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes.”  Id. at 709. 
 44. Providing that it is unlawful for 
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must be irrelevant to employment decisions.”45  The decision further drifted 
from a one-dimensional interpretation of sex discrimination, reasoning for the 
broader application that discrimination due to a deviation of “gender norms” or 
conducting one’s self in a manner that is associated with the opposite gender is 
a form of sex discrimination for the purposes of Title VII because it takes 
“gender into account.”46 
In light of the Supreme Court broadening what it means to discriminate 
“because of sex,” Congress remained silent, never further narrowing or clearly 
defining the term in regards to Title VII.47  In 1994, Congress passed the Gender-
Motivated Violence Act (GMVA), a subsection of the Violence Against Women 
Act (VAWA), creating a private cause of action for a victim of gender 
stereotyping.48   Although the private cause of action was later struck down by 
the Supreme Court on separation of powers reasons, it is important to note that 
Congress codified the term “gender” after the Price Waterhouse decision, 
indicating that Congress accorded with the interpretation.49  Price Waterhouse 
marked a further untethering of the restrictive definition given in the earlier Title 
VII cases.50  This decision was not rooted in explicit instruction or legislative 
history; instead, it echoed “Congress’ intent to forbid employers to take gender 
                                                     
an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge…or otherwise to discriminate with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” or to “limit, 
segregate, or classify . . . in anyway which would deprive . . . any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect . . . an employee, because of 
such individual’s sex.” 
  
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)).  The Court reasoned that 
“Congress’ intent to forbid employers to take gender into account in making employment decisions 
appears on the face of the statute.”  Id. at 239. 
 45. Id. at 240. 
 46. Id. at 244–45. 
 47. Gilfoil, supra note 11, at 140.  See Luke A. Boso, Acting Gay, Acting Straight: Sexual 
Orientation Stereotyping, 83 TENN. L. REV. 575, 577 (2016).  Sex stereotyping is now becoming 
used as an evidentiary tool for plaintiffs in sexual orientation discrimination cases.  Id. 
 48. See King, supra note 10, at 1023–24.  See also Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 
n.12 (9th Cir. 2000).  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that Congress codified the GMVA with full 
knowledge of the Supreme Court’s definition of sex and gender, denoting an intention to preserve 
the Court’s reasoning in legislation.  Id. 
 49. See King, supra note 10, at 1023–24.  See also Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1201 n.12 (citing 
Espinoza-Gutierrez v. Smith, 94. F.3d 1270, 1275 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that “when Congress 
adopts language” from court precedent, Congress intends the term to have the same meaning as 
case law)). 
 50. Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 1307, 1309 (2012). 
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into account . . . on the face of the statute,”51 therefore recognizing that “Title 
VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination must reach situations that were likely not 
contemplated by the 88th Congress.”52 
II. CAUSES OF ACTION: TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
DISCRIMINATION 
A. Causes of Action 
To establish a cause of action for a violation of Title VII’s prohibition of 
discrimination, a plaintiff must first “establish membership in a protected 
class.”53  Though initially addressing the disparate treatment of women in 
regards to employment opportunities, the Court has now provided that “because 
of sex” discrimination, can encompass many forms of conduct.54  For example, 
a policy that disparately affects women as opposed to men, or disparate 
treatment towards an employee because she is female constitutes Title VII 
violations in the purest form of a prima facie case.55 
Once courts understood Title VII to include sexual harassment, the majority 
of jurisdictions required a plaintiff to show: (1) he/she was discriminated against 
because of sex; and (2) that the discrimination was severe to the point of 
                                                     
 51. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239. 
 52. Gilfoil, supra note 11, at 141. 
 53. Gay, supra note 22, at 69 (The overwhelming theory in employment discrimination is that 
most employers do not leave evidence of their discriminatory intent; therefore, the Supreme Court 
established a framework, making it easier for a plaintiff to succeed in employment discrimination 
cases.).  Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, to establish a prima facie case under Title VII, 
a plaintiff must illustrate 1) membership within a protected class; 2) the professional competency 
to perform their job; 3) the employer acted adversely to them; and 4) show facts and circumstances 
that lend support to an inference of discrimination.  Gay, supra note 22, at 69 (citing McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). 
 54. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253–54 (1981) (holding that once 
a plaintiff has established protected class status for purposes of Title VII, it is then up to the 
employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer had a “legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason,” for its action against the employee or applicant); see also King, supra note 
10, at 1014–15. 
 55. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252–53.  Disparate treatment sex discrimination occurs where there 
is “overt or intentional discrimination” by an employer against a group or individual because of the 
group or individual’s sex.  Gay, supra note 22, at 69–70 (finding an employee must show exposure 
to “disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment that the other sex [has] not.”  On the other 
end of the spectrum, disparate impact sex discrimination causes of action can result from what 
appears to be facially neutral employment practices that are applied evenly to employees but have 
a disproportionate impact that excludes women or men of equal employment, and there is no 
requirement for the plaintiff to show intent.). 
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“alter[ing] the terms or conditions of . . . employment and created an abusive 
working environment.”56 
There are three approaches for a plaintiff to establish a same-sex sexual 
harassment suit: (1) plaintiff can show harassment was motivated by sexual 
desire; (2) can show that the accused harasser was motivated by hostility towards 
the presence of the plaintiff’s sex in the workplace; or (3) can produce evidence 
that shows a harasser treated men and women differently.57  Disparate 
impact/treatment, sexual harassment, and hostile work environments are not 
exhaustive; circuits have also recognized a gender stereotyping claim, rooted in 
the majority opinion in Price Waterhouse.58  To succeed, a plaintiff must show 
that the adverse employment action taken by an accused harasser or employer 
was to punish a plaintiff’s failure to adhere to gender norms.59 
B. Traditional Approaches to Denying Protections 
The traditional approach to denying Title VII protections against sexual 
orientation has been supported by three viewpoints.60  First, courts have 
provided that Title VII cannot apply because sexuality was not considered when 
Title VII was passed.61  Second, courts look to the lack of subsequent legislative 
action by Congress to include sexual orientation prohibitions.62  A third 
approach warns of the risk of judicial expansion of Title VII because it could 
create a new protected class.63 
Prior to Zarda, the Second Circuit adhered to the traditional majority 
approach, disqualifying employees and applicants who are discriminated against 
because of their sexuality from showing a cognizable claim of disparate 
treatment/impact, sexual harassment or hostile work environment.64  The Second 
                                                     
 56. Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1134 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 57. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80–81 (1998). 
 58. Surette, supra note 6, at § 5; see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).  
See also Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 291–92 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding it unable 
to distinguish whether a plaintiff was harassed due to his homosexuality or his effeminate nature, 
the Third Circuit determined he had a cognizable claim under Title VII because there was evidence 
to suggest that he operated in his work duties with a high voice and feminine walk). 
 59. Surette, supra note 6, at § 34. 
 60. Register, supra note 4, at 1416–17. 
 61. Id. at 1417. 
 62. Id. at 1418. 
 63. Id. 
 64. At the time of the Zarda decision, several circuits had rulings in place that disallowed 
sexual orientation as a basis for claims of workplace discrimination, to include the First, Third, 
Fourth, Sixth, Eight, and Tenth Circuits.  See Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 471 
(6th Cir. 2012); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 2009); Medina v. 
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Circuit previously provided that sexual orientation discrimination is not 
sufficient to establish that an employer acted adversely for failure to act as a 
stereotypical man or woman.65 
C. The EEOC and Three Arguments: Associational, Comparative and Gender-
Stereotyping 
Within the confines of “Title VII, Congress created the [EEOC] to resolve 
claims and disputes” of discrimination in employment practices.66  Due to the 
uncertainty of legislative intent as to the term “sex” in sex discrimination, federal 
courts and administrative agencies such as the EEOC have had to resort to their 
own guidelines and interpretations of Title VII which in turn heavily influence 
circuit decisions.67 
In 2016, the EEOC issued a decision in which it determined that a claim 
“alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation in violation of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 lies within the Commission’s jurisdiction.”68  The 
EEOC took a novel approach for the agency and focused the inquiry on whether 
or not the employer “has ‘relied on sex-based considerations’ or ‘take[n] gender 
into account’ when taking the challenged employment action.”69 
This conclusion found support via three approaches employed by the EEOC.70  
First, there is a comparative argument: sexual orientation discrimination 
necessarily requires taking a person’s sex into consideration.71  Second, there is 
an associational argument: the EEOC found that sexual orientation 
discrimination is a type of associational discrimination.72  The third approach, a 
gender stereotyping argument, which has become the most successful argument 
                                                     
Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic 
Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 
143 (4th Cir. 1996); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 65. Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 66. Gay, supra note 22, at 68 (The EEOC achieves this “through compliance, informal 
voluntary agreements, and informal employment practices.”  To that end, “the EEOC has the 
authority to investigate accusations of discrimination against covered employers that are submitted 
by an applicant or employee . . . .”  Such applicant or employee is required by Title VII to go 
through the EEOC before filing a lawsuit in court.). 
 67. Gay, supra note 22, at 68–69. 
 68. Baldwin v. Foxx, 2015 WL 4397641, at *1 (E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015). 
 69. Id. at *4 (quoting Macy v. Holder, 2012 WL 1435995, at *6 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012)). 
 70. Id. at *4–5. 
 71. Id. at *5–6. 
 72. Id. at *6–7. 
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among federal courts,73 adapts the Price Waterhouse prohibition on taking 
“gender into account” and the “comparable evils” framework of Oncale.74  This 
argument suggests that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex 
discrimination because it relies on a person failing to adhere to a form of gender 
stereotyping: men are supposed to date women and women date men.75  The 
EEOC ultimately held that sexual orientation discrimination is inherently 
discrimination based on gender stereotypes; providing that “[s]exual orientation 
discrimination is sex discrimination because it necessarily entails treating an 
employee less favorably because of the employee’s sex.”76 
Baldwin influenced subsequent cases involving alleged sexual orientation 
discrimination77, most notably the comparative approach utilized in Hively v. Ivy 
Tech Community College of Indiana.78  In Hively, an openly lesbian, part-time 
adjunct professor who began teaching at Ivy Tech Community College in 2000, 
“applied for at least six full-time positions between 2009 and 2014.”79  These 
attempts were unsuccessful, and her employment contract was not renewed.80  
The Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc granted her appeal, and formulated a 
comparative test to determine whether the plaintiff “described a situation in 
which, holding all other things constant and changing only her sex, she would 
have been treated the same way.”81  The Seventh Circuit concluded that had 
Hively been a man, her employer would not have taken any adverse employment 
actions for dating a woman; and concluded that she was discriminated against 
                                                     
 73. Id. at *7.  See Raelynn J. Hillhouse, Reframing the Argument: Sexual Orientation 
Discrimination as Sex Discrimination Under Equal Protection, 20 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 49, 87 
(2018) (“The gender-stereotyping theory is the most persuasive to federal judges.  Seventy-six 
percent of courts that reasoned that sexual orientation discrimination either is or may be a form of 
sex discrimination embrace the gender-stereotyping theory.”). 
 74. Baldwin, 2015 WL 439764, at *9. 
For example, assume that an employer suspends a lesbian employee for displaying a 
photo of her female spouse on her desk, but does not suspend a male employee for 
displaying a photo of his female spouse on his desk.  The lesbian employee in that 
example can allege that her employer took an adverse action against her that the employer 
would not have taken had she been male. 
Id. at 5.  The Ninth Circuit interprets “sex” to include one’s biological sex or gender, permitting a 
gender stereotyping claim—this approach requires the plaintiff to established that they have 
experienced adverse employment action due to a failure to exhibit traits associated with their 
gender.  See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201–02 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 75. Baldwin, 2015 WL 439764, at *6. 
 76. Id. at *5. 
 77. Id. at *1. 
 78. Surette, supra note 6, at §§ 6–7. 
 79. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 345. 
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based on her sex and that “employment discrimination on the basis of . . . sexual 
orientation . . .  [establishes] a case of sex discrimination for Title VII 
purposes.”82  The Seventh Circuit, considering Supreme Court precedent with 
Baldwin, provided that, “[t]he logic of the Supreme Court’s decisions, as well as 
the common-sense-reality that it is actually impossible to discriminate on the 
basis of sexual orientation without discriminating on the basis of sex, persuade 
us . . . .”83  This reasoning became a harbinger, laying a foundation for the 
Second Circuit’s en banc ruling.84 
III. ZARDA V. ALTITUDE EXPRESS AND NEW HORIZONS 
A. Factual Background 
Donald Zarda, a gay male, worked as a sky diving instructor for Altitude 
Express during the summer of 2010.85  Zarda, as an instructor, regularly 
participated in tandem skydives requiring him to be “strapped hip-to-hip and 
shoulder-to-shoulder with clients.”86  During a skydiving instruction with a 
female client, in an attempt to assuage any discomfort she might experience due 
to the physical contact associated with the tandem jump,87 Zarda told her “he 
was gay and ha[d] an ex-husband to prove it.”88 
After the successful tandem dive, the female client informed her boyfriend of 
Zarda’s comment pertaining to his sexual orientation.89  Shortly thereafter, the 
boyfriend contacted Zarda’s boss who subsequently fired him.90  Zarda sued 
Altitude Express (doing business as Skydive Long Island) and owner Raymond 
Maynard, alleging discrimination in violation of Title VII and New York law.91 
                                                     
 82. Id. at 351–52. 
 83. Id. at 350–51. 
 84. Surette, supra note 6, at § 4. 
 85. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.  Zarda regularly informed female clients of his sexual orientation when accompanied 
by a spouse or boyfriend.   Zarda v. Altitude Express, 855 F.3d 76, 80 (2d. Cir. 2017) 
 89. Zarda, 883 F.3d  at 108 (stating “the client alleged that Zarda inappropriately touched her 
and disclosed his sexual orientation to excuse his behavior”). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Zarda, 855 F.3d at 79–80 (stating “Altitude Express . . . contend[ed] that Zarda was fired 
because he failed to provide an enjoyable experience for a customer . . . Zarda assert[ed] . . . [he] 
was fired . . . because of his supervisor’s prejudice against homosexuals or because he informed a 
client about his sexuality”). 
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B. The Ride Up: Procedural Posture 
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment; the trial court granted the 
defendants’ motion, holding that the Second Circuit did not recognize sexual 
orientation discrimination as a cognizable claim under Title VII.92  Zarda 
appealed the district court’s decision requesting that the circuit court reconsider 
precedent “to hold that Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination based on ‘sex’ 
encompasses discrimination based on ‘sexual orientation.’”93  The Court of 
Appeals declined the request, “[s]ince a three-judge panel . . . lacks the power to 
overturn Circuit precedent.”94 
C. Back-up Parachute: The EEOC and Zarda’s Second Wind 
During initial trial proceedings, the EEOC decided Baldwin, holding that 
sexual orientation discrimination is a form of discrimination because of sex.95  
In light of the EEOC guidance, the Second Circuit reconsidered Zarda’s petition 
and reconvened to reconsider whether Title VII prohibits discrimination based 
on sexual orientation.96  The Second Circuit’s en banc decision identified sexual 
orientation discrimination as a subset of sex discrimination based on a failure to 
adhere to gender norms and ultimately prohibited by Title VII, and thus, a 
cognizable claim within the jurisdiction of the Second Circuit.97  The effect of 
this decision has been widespread—overruling years of Second Circuit 
precedence and has influenced decisions in multiple circuits: such as the Fifth, 
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits.98 
                                                     
 92. Id. at 79. 
 93. Id. at 80. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Baldwin v. Foxx, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5 (E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015). 
 96. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 100. 
 97. Id. at 131–32. 
 98. Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217–23 (2d Cir. 2005); Simonton v. 
Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000).  Since Dawson and Simonton, there have been several 
subsequent lower court decisions in the Second Circuit.  See Cargian v. Breitling USA, Inc., 737 F. 
App’x 41, 41 (2d Cir. 2018); Daniel v. T&M Prot. Res. LLC, No. 13 Civ. 4384, 2018 WL 3621810, 
at *15–16 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2018); Garay v. Manchester Police Dep’t, No. 3:17cv1596, 2018 WL 
1997251, at *1–2 (D. Conn., Apr. 27, 2018) (stating that sexual orientation discrimination is 
prohibited by Title VII).  Other circuits have also followed, see Somers v. Dig. Realty Trust Inc., 
No. 14-cv-05180, 2018 WL 3730469, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2018); Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co., 
304 F. Supp. 3d 627, 634 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (holding that transgender status is protected under Title 
VII); see also EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 574 (6th Cir. 2018) 
(holding that the EEOC has the jurisdiction to pursue claims of sex discrimination based on 
transgender identity). 
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D. Jump On: Legislative Intent 
The Zarda majority begins its analysis of sexual orientation discrimination by 
pointing to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII as a “broad rule of 
workplace equality”99 that attacks “the entire spectrum of disparate treatment,” 
based on characteristics protected by law,100 and that “Title VII should be 
interpreted broadly to achieve equal employment opportunity.”101  Recognizing 
that this broad interpretation is not a “blank slate” in deciding whether Title VII 
prohibits sexual orientation discrimination; courts must “construe the text in 
light of the entirety of the statute as well as relevant precedent.”102  The Second 
Circuit is not promoting an interpretation contrary to legislative intent; instead 
the opinion focuses on Congress’ broader intent to prohibit “impermissible 
consideration of . . . sex . . . in employment practices.”103  Title VII is applied to 
reach a broad spectrum of sex discrimination because “sex is necessarily a factor 
in sexual orientation.”104 
E. Jump On: Sexual Orientation as a Function of Sex—Supreme Court 
Jurisprudence 
The Zarda majority explores the nature of sexual orientation discrimination 
by first consulting the dictionary for a definition of sexual orientation.105  The 
Second Circuit noted that in order to recognize a person’s sexual orientation, 
you must first acknowledge the person’s sex and the sex of the person to whom 
they are attracted.106  The majority states that “Congress intended to make sex 
‘irrelevant’ to employment decisions [and] the Supreme Court has held that Title 
VII prohibits not just discrimination based on sex . . . but also discrimination 
based on traits that are a function of sex, such as life expectancy, and non-
                                                     
 99. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Harris v. 
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993)). 
 100. Id. (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707–09 (1978) 
(holding that having women contribute more to a pension plan because they have a longer life 
expectancy violates Title VII)). 
 101. Id. (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–36 (1971)). 
 102. Id. at 112. 
 103. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m) (2012)). 
 104. Id. (“This statutory reading is reinforced . . . because sexual orientation discrimination is 
predicated on assumptions about how persons of a certain sex can or should be . . . .”). 
 105. Id. at 113 (citing Sexual Orientation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The 
term ‘sexual orientation’ refers to ‘[a] person’s predisposition or inclination toward sexual activity 
or behavior with other males or females.’”)). 
 106. Id. (quoting Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 358 (7th Cir. 2017) (Flaum, 
J., concurring) (“One cannot consider a person’s homosexuality without also accounting for their 
sex: doing so would render ‘same’ [sex] . . . meaningless.”)). 
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conformity with gender norms.”107  Application of traits that are a “function” or 
a “proxy” of sex accords with the Supreme Court’s view that Title VII applies 
to more than “the principal evil Congress was concerned with” when the statute 
was enacted in 1964,”108 and that it applies to “reasonably comparable evils.”109 
To reinforce their conclusion, the Second Circuit used a “comparative test”110 
that asks, “whether an employee’s treatment would have been different ‘but for 
that person’s sex.’”111  For example, if a lesbian employee successfully 
performing her duties was denied employment and a male in the same position 
who was attracted to women received a promotion, sex is part of the 
consideration because the female employee would not have been denied a 
promotion “but for” her gender.112  Finally, the Second Circuit utilized the 
gender stereotyping approach steeped in the logic of Price Waterhouse,113 
equating Zarda’s termination for his sexuality as akin to being terminated for not 
living up to the gender stereotype that men should date women.114 
F. Tandem with the Majority: Concurrences 
Circuit Judge Dennis Jacobs concurred with the majority in observing that 
Zarda raised a claim for sex discrimination under Title VII and that sexual 
orientation is a subset of sex discrimination.115  However, he differed from the 
majority on multiple jurisdictional matters.116  Circuit Judge Jose A. Cabranes 
concurred only in the judgement, providing, “Zarda’s sexual orientation is a 
function of his sex.  Discrimination against (him) because of his sexual 
orientation therefore is discrimination because of his sex, and is prohibited by 
Title VII.  That should be the end of the analysis.”117  Circuit Judge Robert Sack 
                                                     
 107. Id. at 112 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989); L.A. Dep’t 
of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 
436 (1971)). 
 108. Id. at 115 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998)). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 116 (using the Court’s “comparative test” to determine whether a basis for 
discrimination is a function of sex). 
 111. Id. (citing Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711). 
 112. Id.  The Zarda court echoed the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Hively, to conclude 
that, “it follows that sexual orientation discrimination is a subset of sex discrimination.”  Id. (citing 
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 345 (7th Cir. 2017)). 
 113. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989). 
 114. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 133 (Jacobs, J., concurring); see Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228, 250–
51. 
 115. Id. at 132. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 135 (Cabranes, J., concurring). 
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concurred only on the grounds that sexual orientation is a form of gender 
stereotyping discrimination, (i.e., acting or not acting in a way associated with a 
person’s sex).118 
Circuit Judge Raymond Lohier, Jr. concurred in the ultimate holding, stating, 
“I agree with the majority opinion that there is no reasonable way to disentangle 
sex from sexual orientation in interpreting the plain meaning of the words 
‘because of . . . sex.’”119  Judge Lohier dedicated the majority of his concurrence 
in attacking the dissent’s “common meaning of the words” approach.120  His 
concurrence criticized the dissent’s plain meaning approach in applying the 
intent of Congress at the time of the statute’s passing because it ignored Supreme 
Court precedent.121  He also addressed the dissent’s approach in finding a 
“contemporary” and “public” meaning of sex as a “roundabout search for 
legislative history.”122 
G. Free Fall: The Dissent 
The dissent begins with Judge Gerald E. Lynch expressing his desire for 
Congress to pass legislation adding sexual orientation to Title VII protections.123  
After, he embarks on a lengthy history of the civil rights movement for African 
Americans, the pro-women movement and compares it to the history of the 
LGBTQ rights movement, landing on the premise that the historical intent of 
                                                     
 118. Id. at 135–36 (Sack, J., concurring). 
We are now called upon to address questions dealing directly with sex, sexual behavior, 
and sexual taboos, a discussion fraught with moral, religious, political, psychological, 
and other highly charged issues.  For those reasons (among others), I think it is in the 
best interests of us all to tread carefully; to say no more than we must . . . . 
Id. at 135. 
 119. Id. at 136 (Lohier, J., concurring). 
 120. Id. at 136–37. 
 121. Id. (“Time and time again, the Supreme Court has told us that the cart of legislative history 
is pulled by the plain text, not the other way around.  The text here pulls in one direction, namely, 
that sex includes sexual orientation.”). 
 122. Id. at 137. 
 123. Id. (Lynch, J. & Livingston, J., dissenting). 
Speaking solely as a citizen, I would be delighted to awake one morning and learn that 
Congress had just passed legislation adding sexual orientation to the list of grounds of 
employment discrimination prohibited under Title VII . . . .  I am confident that one day—
and I hope that day comes soon—I will have that pleasure. 
I would be equally pleased to awake to learn that Congress had secretly passed such 
legislation more than a half century ago—until I actually woke up and realized that I 
must have been still asleep and dreaming.  Because we all know that Congress did no 
such thing. 
Id. 
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Title VII was to provide protections against workplace discrimination based on 
race, national origin and religion.124 
The argument then transitions to addressing the majority’s use of “judicial 
interpretations of Title VII as prohibiting sexual harassment, and allowing 
hostile work environment claims, in an effort to argue that the expansion they 
are making simply follows in this line [of reasoning].”125  Judge Lynch counters 
the majority by explaining that the statute’s use of race to include all racial 
groups means that the word sex was to include both men and women.126  He 
addresses sexual harassment and exploitation as being included because it has 
been an enduring subject of legislative attention, stating “Representative Smith’s 
amendment, both the literal language . . . and the elimination of the social evil 
at which it was aimed,” meaning that the statute must be read to include it.127  
He reasoned the same for the inclusion of the now established hostile work 
environment protections.128  He then suggests that though sexual orientation 
discrimination may be immoral or economically inefficient, not everything with 
those qualities are illegal; therefore until the legislative process deems 
otherwise, it shall remain legal.129 
After a lengthy attack on the Majority’s linguistic argument,130 Judge Lynch 
distinguishes the holding in Price Waterhouse, opining that the type of gender 
stereotyping that was found to violate Title VII is more similar to the initial 
purpose that Congress intended and that it involves one sex being systematically 
disadvantaged over the other.131  Judge Lynch characterizes Donald Zarda’s 
treatment by his employer as “not just,” but counters this by noting that the 
Constitution protects against discrimination from the government in regards to 
                                                     
 124. Id. at 137–48. 
 125. Id. at 145–46. 
[T]he prohibition of sex discrimination by its plain language protects men as well as 
women, whether or not anyone who voted on the bill specifically considered whether and 
under what circumstances men could be victims of gender-based discrimination.  That is 
not an expansion of Title VII, but is a conclusion mandated by its text. 
Id. 
 126. Id. at 145–47 (“Sexual exploitation has been a principal obstacle to the equal participation 
of women in the workplace, and whether or not individual legislators intended to prohibit it . . . .”). 
 127. Id. at 147. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 148. 
 130. Id. at 137–57. 
 131. Id. at 157 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1998) (“An employer 
who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places women in an 
intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if 
they do not. Title VII lifts women out of this bind.”). 
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the fundamental right to marry, “but it does not promise freedom from 
discrimination by their fellow citizens.”132 
III. ANALYSIS: A SUCCESSFUL DIVE 
Zarda is a soundly reasoned Title VII decision;133 it successfully incorporates 
Supreme Court approaches to legislative interpretation and progressive Title VII 
reasoning to hold that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of Title VII 
prohibition.134  It is practicable because it does not create a new class of protected 
persons, nor does it argue that Title VII expressly prohibits sexual orientation 
discrimination.  Instead, the Second Circuit provides a pathway, paved by 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, to logically conclude that sexual orientation 
discrimination is a form of discrimination prohibited by Title VII. 
A. Tradition: The Weakness of the Legislative Intent Argument 
Legislative intent is persuasive.  Historically, a majority of courts have 
excluded sexual orientation from Title VII protections because reasoned that 
Congress had no initial intent for sexual orientation protections.135  The Zarda 
majority address this argument well by focusing on Supreme Court 
interpretation.  Focusing too much on legislative history may not accurately 
reflect Congressional intent given the nefarious way “sex” was introduced to 
Title VII.  The limited legislative guidance should lead to a broadly construed 
reading of the text, reflecting the overall intent of Title VII: to eliminate 
                                                     
 132. Id. at 166. 
 133. Pratt v. Haw. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, Civ. No. 17-00599, 2018 WL 5850177, at *11 (D. 
Haw. Nov. 8, 2018).  See J. Shahar Dillbary & Griffin Edwards, An Empirical Analysis of Sexual 
Orientation Discrimination, 86 U CHI. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2019).  The article praises Zarda’s reasoning 
as it eliminates a defense under this scenario: An African American male with perfect credentials 
applies for a job while wearing what some would consider women’s clothing and is denied.  Id. at 
15–16.  In a case where the motive is ambiguous (i.e., racial vs. sexual orientation discrimination), 
the employer could deny racial motivation by using the defense that the adverse action was based 
on perceived sexual orientation.  Id.  See generally Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking 
Gay Enough for Title VII, 14 DUKEMINIER AWARDS 715 (2015).  Individuals who appear to be gay 
but never verify or provide their sexuality have been afforded success in gender stereotyping cases; 
however gay employees whose sexuality is revealed by preference, association, relationship status 
or via casual conversation are less meritorious, as many jurisdictions do not permit sexual 
orientation discrimination as a form of gender stereotyping claims.  Id. at 741–42, 755–57. 
 134. John Richards & Brett Janich, A Practitioner’s Guide to Zarda v. Altitude Express, LAW 
360 (March 5, 2018, 12:23 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1018180/a-practitioner-s-guide-
to-zarda-v-altitude-express.  The Second Circuit used three separate constitutional theories 
established by the Supreme Court: because of sex, sex stereotype, and associational discrimination 
theories to reach the single conclusion that Title VII prohibits sexual orientation discrimination.  Id. 
 135. Surette, supra note 6, at § 2. 
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impermissible workplace discriminations.  Broad construction is not merely a 
convenient means to extend protections to LGBTQ employees and applicants; it 
also aligns with the broad construction approach overwhelmingly utilized by the 
Supreme Court in Title VII cases.  The Supreme Court has recognized that Title 
VII should apply to “reasonably comparable evils;”136 narrowly construing sex 
by its plain meaning is contrapositive to the Supreme Court’s approach.  Zarda 
correctly addresses the broad aims of Congress in striking at an array of 
workplace discrimination while utilizing Supreme Court precedent as a guide. 
The Zarda dissent argue for the false dichotomy—that until Congress makes 
sexual orientation discrimination illegal, it shall be legal—and because Congress 
has not made it illegal, it further enforces the argument that Title VII does not 
include sexual orientation discrimination protections.  In light of relevant law, 
this argument is weak.  First, there is nothing in the text of Title VII that 
expressly provides these protections to heterosexuals only.137  Second, 
Congressional inaction as a reason to deny protection to LGBTQ individuals is 
unpersuasive.  Laws uniformly criminalizing domestic violence and the ending 
of coverture laws developed first from the courts while Congress remained 
silent.138  Why can the Court act prior to Congressional prohibition for some 
injustices and not others?  The dissent’s argument is an unsatisfactory way of 
answering this crucial question.  If one can conclude that sexual orientation 
discrimination is not prohibited because Congress has not expressly proscribed 
it, “‘several equally tenable inferences’ may be drawn from such inaction, 
‘including the inference that the existing legislation’”139 is not a valid indication 
of whether sex discrimination encompasses sexual orientation. 
The Zarda dissent makes an attempt to explain the hasty addition of “sex” by 
providing that because pro-women legislation has been a topic of Congressional 
debate before ratification and that there was a strong push from interest groups 
to include the surreptitiously added provision one day before the vote, that it is 
logical to read Congress’ intent to protect only women from invidious 
discrimination in the workplace.  This, too, conveniently dismisses the fact that 
sex was not added or proposed by the same special interest groups that the 
                                                     
 136. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
 137. Surette, supra note 6, at § 2. 
 138. An example of an action that has been universally proscribed in U.S. jurisdictions that 
was not prohibited by an act of Congress is state withdrawal of coverture laws on constitutional 
grounds (coverture was the common law term to describe the exemption given to husbands in cases 
of marital rape; because a woman’s rights were subsumed to her husband’s, a wife could not legally 
bring a claim for rape).  See Lalenya Weintraub Siegel, The Marital Rape Exemption: Evolution to 
Extinction, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 352 (1995).  Similarly, the criminalization of domestic 
violence first had its movement by state and constitutional arguments, not legislative.  See Deborah 
Tuerkheimer, Criminal Law: Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to 
Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 969–71 (2004). 
 139. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (quoting United 
States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962)). 
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dissent credits in having ushered the legislation through.  Attempting to use an 
absence of legislative intent to reason that sexual orientation should not be 
included ignores the Supreme Court’s interpretation and places too much 
emphasis on the plain text of a provision that was intentioned to stifle the entirety 
of protections the Civil Rights Act was intended to provide. 
It seems illogical for the dissent to place so much emphasis on the legislative 
intent while ignoring the history of the statute.  In Judge Lynch’s rationale for 
not extending Title VII protections to sexual orientation, which is utilized by a 
majority of jurisdictions, he suggests that while the Constitution promises 
protection from discrimination from the government it does not protect from 
discrimination by fellow citizens.  This logic does not work.  Despite correctly 
identifying that the Constitution does not promise protection from 
discrimination by fellow citizens, it fails to realize that Title VII does just that!  
It promises a multitude of protections from discrimination by fellow citizens in 
the workplace. 
The Zarda dissent argues for the premise that: while Title VII protects 
individuals from discrimination by fellow citizens in the workplace on the basis 
of race, religion, gender, and even a lack of conformance to gender stereotypes, 
it should NOT be extended to include sexual orientation because the 
Constitution does not explicitly promise it.  The Constitution makes no explicit 
promise of protection from workplace discrimination on the basis of race or 
religion either; yet those protections are extant under Title VII. 
B. Gender Stereotyping 
The strongest argument for including sexual orientation discrimination within 
the protections of Title VII is the prohibition against gender stereotyping.  The 
holding in Price Waterhouse, and the reasonably comparable evils approach of 
Oncale140 are highly persuasive.  Denying a promotion to a female because she 
acts too masculine is impermissible because it necessarily takes her gender into 
account.  Likewise, if an employer fires a male employee for being gay, it is 
necessarily relying on sex because one cannot disapprove of a person’s sexual 
orientation without first taking into consideration the sex of that person. 
The Zarda dissent acknowledges Title VII extends to reasonably comparable 
evils of Congress’ intent and argues that the prohibition of gender stereotyping 
is within the original intent of the statute.  Under this reasoning, it would be 
unlawful to fire a male because his superior believed that he acted too feminine, 
but it would be permissible to fire him for being gay.  There is a fundamental 
danger in this because as it stands in a majority of jurisdictions, sexual 
orientation discrimination can be used as a defense against other forms of 
discrimination.  For example, if a lesbian African American is denied promotion 
due to discrimination, she may assert a claim that she was discriminated against 
                                                     
 140. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75. 
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due to her race and/or gender.  The employer could defend against this 
accusation by simply claiming she was denied because she is gay, creating a 
lawful defense to an impermissible consideration of race and gender.  The 
Supreme Court has provided a guide to this inconsistency: the extension of Title 
VII protection to reasonably comparable evils.  The majority correctly identifies 
the inconsistency and construes precedent to establish that firing an employee 
for being gay is a reasonably comparable evil to firing a female employee for 
acting too masculine, or terminating an employee based on race, religion or 
national origin. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Zarda is soundly reasoned.  The Second Circuit correctly applied Baldwin; 
however, Baldwin should serve as only a blueprint.  Although the EEOC has 
been vested by Congress to have the authority to interpret and apply Title VII, 
courts have inconsistently relied on the agency’s decisions.  The EEOC often 
changes guidance on these matters. 
The Supreme Court, in Oncale and Price Waterhouse, established that Title 
VII covers reasonably comparable evils, and that adverse action in employment 
matters due to failure to adhere to gender roles is an impermissible consideration 
of sex.  The Zarda court’s reasoning illustrates the undeniable link between 
sexual orientation discrimination and impermissible consideration of gender in 
adverse employment actions.  The function of this decision is further illustrated 
by the subsequent circuit holdings; evidencing a persuasive argument.  The value 
in this approach is that it proscribes sexual orientation discrimination without 
creating an additional protected class.  Linking sexual orientation discrimination 
to gender stereotyping is a practical method to ensure that people are protected 
in their employment from characteristics that have no relevance to the job duties 
they are fulfilling.  An employee’s sexual orientation has the same correlation 
to the effectiveness of job performance as does an employee’s marital status, 
race, or national origin.  Title VII should be interpreted to fully realize its 
potential: to strike at discrimination in the work force, eliminating 
considerations of an employee’s life that do not relate to employment.  The law 
should not be read to allow some forms of discrimination and not others when 
the Supreme Court precedent has soundly interpreted Congress’ intent to apply 
to reasonably comparative evils. 
 
